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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
provision of the Railway Labor Act does not unreasonably violate an
employee's right to contract. Further, infringement which might occur
would be a reasonable exercise of Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce.
The more difficult point to resolve is whether freedom of speech is
violated by the use of funds, collected under a union shop clause, to sup-
port programs which the plaintiffs oppose. Our courts have realized that
in certain instances the right of free speech must be abridged in order to
maintain our security. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
although the right of freedom of speech is fundamental, it is not absolute.
In Whitney v. California," speaking of the rights of free speech and
assembly, Mr. Justice Brandeis said: "Their exercise is subject to restric-
tion, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to protect
the State from destruction or from serious injury, political, economic, or
moral. '12 There are many cases where freedom of speech has been re-
stricted by labor legislation, but most of these cases deal with preventing
employers from using coercive language to dissuade employees from exer-
cising their collective bargaining rights.13
When this case or a case involving similar facts and presenting the
same issue reaches the United States Supreme Court, it is highly possible
that the decision will not support the holding of the Georgia courts. This
decision seems to go against the trend found in the Supreme Court deci-
sions and would cause great repercussions in organized labor which would
be adverse to the general welfare of the nation. For these reasons it does
not seem probable that this decision will be affirmed by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
11 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
12 Ibid., at 373 (emphasis supplied).
1a N.L.R.B. v. Bailey, 180 F.2d 278 (C.A. 6th, 1950); N.L.R.B. v. Kropp Forge, 178
F.2d 822 (C.A. 7th, 1949); N.L.R.B. v. Winona Textile Mills, 160 F.2d 201 (C.C.A. 8th,
1947); N.L.R.B. v. American Tube Bending, 134 F.2d 993 (C.C.A.2d, 1943).
PROCEDURE-FOREIGN CORPORATION HELD NOT SUB-
JECT TO ILLINOIS JURISDICTION UNDER CIVIL
PRACTICE ACT, SECTION SEVENTEEN, UNLESS
PHYSICALLY PRESENT WHEN "DOING
BUSINESS" IN ILLINOIS
In 1953, after a series of negotiations at plaintiff's office in Chicago,
between defendant, a New York manufacturing corporation not licensed
to do business in Illinois, and plaintiff, an Illinois distributor of office
machines, a contract was allegedly entered into, the terms of which were
stated in a letter sent from defendant in New York to plaintiff in Illinois.
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Under this agreement plaintiff, who had been selling defendant's machines
in Illinois since 1939, was made exclusive distributor of Addo machines
in the Illinois area. Upon receipt of orders from plaintiff, defendant de-
livered machines to an independent carrier in New York for shipment to
plaintiff in Illinois. Over a two and one-half year period, $150,000.00
worth of machines were purchased by plaintiff in this manner. Upon
defendant's repudiation of the agreement and its appointment of other
Illinois distributors, plaintiff filed suit in Illinois, claiming Illinois had
jurisdiction over defendant Addo under Section 17 (1) (a) of Chapter 110,
Illinois Revised Statutes, 1955, and joined the Illinois distributors as co-
defendants.' Addo filed a special appearance to contest jurisdiction, and
an order was entered quashing service of summons, which was affirmed
by the appellate court.2 The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the lower
courts, holding Section 17(1) (a) inapplicable, in that defendant was not
deemed to have established those minimum contacts with Illinois necessary
to submit to the jurisdiction of that state. Grobark v. Addo Machine Co.,
16 I11. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959).
The constitutional question of due process is always involved where a
state exercises in personam jurisdiction over absent nonresidents. Orig-
inally, because of the capias ad respondendum, due process came to be
synonymous with physical power.3 As formulated in Pennoyer v. Neff,4
due process could only be satisfied where a state had actual physical con-
trol over the person of the defendant. Due to the rapid change of social,
technological, and legal concepts, this stringent limitation of a state's
exercise of jurisdiction gave rise to various legal fictions,5 especially where
the defendant was a corporation. In such a case the complexity increased
because of the rule that a corporation's legal entity was deemed to exist
only in the state of incorporation. 7 Therefore, it was a logical consequence
of the physical power doctrine that a corporation could only be sued in
1 Section 17(1) (a) provides: "(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident
of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter
enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal representa-
tive, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising
from the doing of any of said acts: (a) The transaction of any business within this
State ......
2 Grobark v. Addo Machine Co., 18 111. App.2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 466 (1958).
3 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
495 U.S. 714 (1877).
5 Westcott-Alexander v. Dailey, 264 F.2d 853 (C.A. 4th, 1959); McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d
139 (C.C.A.2d, 1931).
6 Westcott-Alexander v. Dailey, 264 F.2d 853 (C.A. 4th, 1959).
7 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839).
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the state of its creation.8 The concepts employed to circumvent this con-
clusion included such things as the "consent" doctrine,9 the "presence"
doctrine,10 the "doing business" doctrine" and the upholding of various
state statutes of requiring the appointment of a resident agent to receive
service of process as a condition precedent to being permitted to do
business in the state.12
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,18 the Supreme Court at-
tempted to do away with the existing confusion by laying down a new
test. In holding that jurisdiction attached over a nonresident corporation
by virtue of its employment of agents within the forum state to solicit
orders with authority to contract for display rooms and equipment the
court said:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant in personam,
he have certain minimum contact with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between
those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those
which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not
merely, as has sometimes been suggested, whether the activity, which the cor-
poration has seen fit to procure through its- agents in another state, is a little
more or a little less .... Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather
upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause
to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.14
Thus, in a relatively short period, the foundation for the test of due
process changed from the strict requirement of physical power over the
defendant to the flexible requirement of minimum contacts between the
defendant corporation and the forum state. The factors to be considered
in determining whether in a given case, minimum contacts have been
established, include such things as, the nature and character of the busi-
8 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (U.S.) 168 (1868).
O Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361 (1933); LaFayette Insurance Co. v.
French, 59 U.S. 404 (1855).
10 Philadelphia & Reading R.R. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Pennsylvania
Lumbermen's Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Meyer, 197 U.S. 407 (1905); Tanza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
11 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Hutchinson v.
Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (C.C.A.2d, 1931).
12 Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 254 (1909); St. Clair v. Cox,
106 U.S. 350 (1882).
13 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
14 Ibid., at 316, 319 (emphasis supplied).
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ness; 15 the number and type of activities undertaken in the forum state;16
whether such activities gave rise to the cause of action;17 and whether the
forum state has some special interest in granting relief to plaintiff, as a
resident of the state.' The furthest extension of jurisdiction under the
doctrine was reached in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,'19
where the only contacts with the state of the forum were the mailing
of a reinsurance certificate to a California resident offering to insure him
in accordance with an earlier policy, and his acceptance and payment of
the premiums by mail until his death.
By virtue of the authority of these decisions, many states were quick
to pass statutes which in general enunciated the minimum contact doc-
trine. In 1955, Illinois followed suit by an amendment to Section 17, Chap-
ter 110, which conferred jurisdiction over any person or corporation trans-
acting business within the state. The amendment withstood the test of
constitutionality in Nelson v. Miller,20 and was invoked by plaintiff in
the Grobark case in an attempt to subject defendant to the jurisdiction of
the Illinois courts. Although the Nelson case involved a tort, which pro-
vides another basis for jurisdiction under Section 17, the court spoke in
sweeping terms when it defined the legislative intent motivating Sections
16 and 17: "Sections 16 and 17 of the Civil Practice Act reflect a con-
scious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the
extent permitted by the due-process clause."
21
Thus, Nelson is seen as a declaration of intention by the Illinois Su-
preme Court to conform to the trend of expanded jurisdiction over absent
nonresident defendants. 22 In subsequent decisions involving Section 17(1)
(a), the courts held jurisdiction to attach over out-of-state defendants by
virtue of: (1) a contract negotiated for and executed in Illinois, for the
sale of a part interest in an oil well located in Texas;23 (2) the formation
15 MacInnes v. Fountainebleau, 257 F.2d 832 (C.A.2d, 1958).
16International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 321 (1945); Green v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1906).
17 Simon v. Southern R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); French v. Gibbs, 189 F.2d 787
(CA.2d, 1951).
18 McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Traveler's Health
Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
19 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
20 11 I1.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
21 Ibid., at 389, 679 (emphasis supplied).
22 In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957), the court
said: "Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible
toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations
and [individuals]."
28 Bluff Creek Oil Co. v. Green, 257 F.2d 83 (C.A. 5th, 1958).
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of an employment contract in Illinois with an Illinois resident, where the
work was to be performed within the state;2 4 (3) the mere solicitation
and securing of two purchase orders in Illinois by defendant's agent,
coupled with the promise to send an employee to train purchasers in the
use of the equipment.2 5
In all of these cases the out-of-state corporation employed an agent
within the forum state to conduct some activities therein. In the instant
case, an agent came into Illinois for preliminary negotiations with the
plaintiff, but no contract was made at that time. Subsequently, a letter
was sent from defendant in New York to plaintiff in Illinois, which
purportedly made plaintiff exclusive distributor of defendant's machines
in the Illinois area. Only the appellate court considered this letter as a
possible basis for jurisdiction, but rejected the proposition that the letter
was a contract made in Illinois, holding it to be, "unilateral and void for
want of mutuality. '26 The issue therefore resolves itself into a determina-
tion of whether the above activities, coupled with the resulting $150,000.00
worth of machines shipped into Illinois over a two and one-half year
period, constitute minimum contacts with Illinois, when defendant re-
mained outside Illinois during the entire period. In reaching its decision,
the court emphasizes this absence of activity by the defendant within the
state, noting: (1) at no time did defendant maintain an office or employ
an agent in Illinois; (2) defendant shipped machines into Illinois by inde-
pendent carrier; (3) sales of machines were consummated upon receipt of
orders in New York; and (4) plaintiff and defendant had a purchaser-
seller, and not a principal-agent relationship.
Therefore, what the court does in this case is to interpret the "trans-
action of any business" provision of Section 17 quite literally, by requiring
the commission of some definite act or the transaction of some business
within the forum state.2 7 Quoting directly from the recent Supreme
Court case of Hanson v. Denckla,28 the court says:
[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.29
In its reasoning, the court, in Grobark, relied heavily on the Hanson
case. In that case, the settlor of a trust died domiciled in Florida. Prior
24 Sunday v. Donovan, 16 Il. App.2d 116, 147 N.E.2d 401 (1958).
25 Berlcmann v. Superior Distributing Co., 17 111. App.2d 522, 151 NE.2d 116 (1958).
20 Grobark v. Addo Machine Co., 18 I1. App. 10, 15, 151 N.E.2d 466 (1958).
27 Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. Ill., 1959).
28 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
29 Ibid., at 253.
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to her death the deceased had appointed a Delaware trustee, while she
was in Delaware. The trustee and the trust assets remained exclusively in
Delaware. The United States Supreme Court found Florida had jurisdic-
tion over neither the trustee nor over the trust assets.80 In ruling on this
relatively simple question of jurisdiction, the court used the following
strong language, quoted in the Grobark case:
[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend (in expanding jurisdiction) heralds
the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts. Those restrictions [on in personam jurisdiction] are a consequence of
territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.31
In the Grobark case, the dissenting opinion of Justice Davis, joined by
Justice Schaeffer, noted the apparent contradiction of the majority opinion
with the Nelson case, where the legislative intent was defined as the "asser-
tion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by
the due process clause." In declaring defendant Addo to have the neces-
sary minimum contacts, Justice Davis referred to: (1) defendant's nego-
tiations with plaintiff in Chicago to establish the relationship; (2) the sale
of $150,000.00 worth of defendant's machines to an Illinois resident over
a two and one-half year period; (3) the presence of the individual resi-
dent defendants, and the inability of plaintiff to join them in any New
York action; and (4) the underlying purpose of the minimum contacts
doctrine which he felt this case defeats.
The Grobark case is seen as a limitation of the trend of expanding juris-
diction over foreign corporations and individuals, to which Illinois had
expressly conformed previously. In interpreting Section 17(1) (a) as re-
quiring, literally, the transaction of business by the defendant within the
state, the court is, in effect, limiting the decisions in Traveler's Health
Association v. Virginia,32 and McGee v. International Life Insurance
Co.,3 3 to contracts of insurance. A case decided after Grobark, Insull v.
New York World-Telegram Corp.,3 4 expressly adhered to Grobark and
reached the same conclusion. In denying jurisdiction over an out-of-state
publisher whose only contacts with Illinois were the shipping of news-
papers which allegedly contained libelous material to several Illinois news-
dealers and subscribers, the court said:
Although jurisdiction premised upon such a transaction [a contract for
insurance] has been sustained as constitutional in terms which could also apply
to other types of business transactions . . . we are not thereby authorized to
3 0Contra, on closely analogous facts in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
31 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). 33 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
2 3239 U.S. 643 (1949). 84 172 F. Supp. 615 (N.D., Ill., 1959).
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construe Section 17(1) (a) as incorporating by inference the more liberal 17(1)
(d) test.35
From the foregoing, it is to be concluded that Section 17(1)(a) re-
quires the physical presence of the defendant or his agent within Illinois
and the transaction of the business in question at that time, "and not that
he or his agent tr-jnsact the business outside Illinois, or even from outside
Illinois with independent persons in Illinois."36
35 Ibid., at 628.
3(1 Ibid., at 628.
REAL PROPERTY-NEGATIVE RECIPROCAL EASEMENT
HELD RETROACTIVE WHERE COMMON GRANTOR
REACQUIRED LOT ORIGINALLY CONVEYED
WITHOUT RESTRICTION FOR
COLLUSIVE PURPOSE
Defendant grantor conveyed one lot of his original tract to his brother
without any restrictions as to the property's use. He conveyed the re-
maining lots within an area of two blocks of his brother's lot with restric-
tions that the property was to be used only for dwellings of a value of
$5,000 or more. These deeds were recorded, and subsequently, the grant-
or's brother built a duplex valued at less than $5,000 on his lot. The
grantees, whose deeds contained the restrictions, took no action to enjoin
the brother from building the duplex. The brother then reconveyed the
lot to the defendant, who proceeded to build a trailer camp on the
property. Th,: grantees brought this action to enjoin the grantor's ac-
tivities. The chancellor decreed that the grantor was bound by reciprocal
negative easements as to the entire two blocks in the original tract. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of Michigan, the decree was affirmed on
the ground that the grantor was estopped from showing that the recipro-
cal negative easements would be retroactive and, therefore, not binding
on him. Cook v. Bandeen, 356 Mich. 328, 96 N.W.2d 743 (1959).'
The importance of this case lies in the unusual factual situation pre-
sented where a common grantor makes a conveyance without restrictions,
followed by several conveyances with restrictions, and a reconveyance
of the first lot is then made to the common grantor in the hope the prop-
erty will not be subject to the reciprocal negative easements affecting
the other lots.
Generally, a reciprocal negative easement arises when a common grant-
or conveys one lot with restrictions of benefit to all the land retained.
1 The principal case is entitled Brownson v. Bandeen, but was consolidated with and
under the title as given above.
